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1 
Litigation Strategies for Dealing with  
the Indigent Defense Crisis 
 
Eve Brensike Primus
*
 
 
The indigent defense delivery system in the United States is in a state of crisis.
1
  Public 
defenders routinely handle well over 1,000 cases a year, more than three times the number of 
cases that the American Bar Association says one attorney can handle effectively.
2
  As a result, 
many defendants sit in jail for months before even speaking to their court-appointed lawyers.
3
  
And when defendants do meet their attorneys, they are often disappointed to learn that these 
lawyers are too overwhelmed to provide adequate representation.  With public defenders or 
assigned counsel representing more than 80% of criminal defendants nationwide,
4
 the indigent 
defense crisis is a problem that our criminal justice system can no longer afford to ignore. 
 
Both the federal executive and legislative branches have begun to study seriously the 
indigent defense crisis with an eye toward proposed reforms.  Attorney General Eric Holder has 
created an internal working group at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) with instructions “to 
leave no stone unturned in identifying potential funding sources, legislative initiatives, and other 
ways we can work with our state and local partners to establish effective public defense 
systems.”5  Prominent constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe has been appointed the senior 
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1
 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.   
2
 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008; see also 
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:  Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686-87 (2007) (documenting the problems of high public defender caseloads); ABA 
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY 
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provide for a maximum caseload per year of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health 
cases, or 25 appeals). 
3
 See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 
6 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms-
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4
 See Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Feb. 1996, at 4, 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf.   
5
 See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Brennan Legacy Awards Dinner, Brennan Center for Justice 
(Nov. 17, 2009), available at  
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/attorney_general_eric_holder_on_indigent_defense_reform 
[hereinafter “Holder Remarks”]. 
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counselor for access to justice and is spearheading the effort.
6
  And Congress has begun to hold 
hearings to consider ways to address the indigent defense crisis.
7
    
 
This Issue Brief will explore two potential federal legislative initiatives that could help 
remedy the indigent defense crisis in this country.  Before discussing these proposals, however, 
the next section will explain why a federal forum for litigating systemic right-to-counsel 
violations is necessary and why current avenues for federal court review of such claims have 
proven ineffective. 
 
Section II then proposes the creation of a federal enforcement action that would allow 
DOJ (or a private litigant deputized to act on its behalf) to seek equitable relief in federal court 
whenever a state engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives criminal defendants of 
their right to effective counsel.  Similar federal enforcement actions exist in other contexts,
8
 and 
I will discuss how past experience with these statutes can inform the creation of an even more 
effective enforcement action to remedy right-to-counsel problems.   
 
Of course, the efficacy of any statute empowering DOJ to choose whether to file a federal 
enforcement action or deputize private citizens to file one is partly contingent on the politics of 
the incumbent administration.  I therefore offer a second proposal in Section III designed to 
provide backstop protection against an unfriendly administration’s curtailing the enforcement 
action.  Specifically, I propose that Congress create a new post-trial federal habeas corpus cause 
of action designed to redress systemic right-to-counsel problems, and I explain how a systemic 
habeas cause of action would catalyze state reform without running into the problems that other 
attempts at structural reform litigation have faced in the past.
9
   
 
I. The Need for a New Federal Cause of Action 
 
With a spotlight now on the indigent defense crisis, there are many proposals for 
potential reform.  Some have argued for better training for public defenders.
10
  Others would like 
to see more federal funding for indigent defense.
11
  Still others contend that more data should be 
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 See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Prominent Harvard Law Professor Joins Justice Department, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022505697.html. 
7
 See Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan and Other 
States, Hearing before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 
111th Cong. (2009); Indigent Representation:  A Growing National Crisis, Hearing before the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. (2009); see also Press Release, The 
Constitution Project, National Right to Counsel Committee Members Testify on Indigent Defense Crisis and Issue 
Urgent Call for Reforms (June 4, 2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/newsdetail.asp?id=380 
(discussing testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security). 
8
 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141; 42 U.S.C. § 1997a. 
9
 This proposal builds on an idea that I first proposed elsewhere.  See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of 
Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
10
 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 90-92 (1995). 
11
 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
YALE L.J. 1, 70-71 (1997). 
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collected and used to encourage states to fix their own indigent defense systems.
12
  Although I 
agree with many of these proposals, they are expensive if the goal is nationwide reform.  In 
Tennessee, for example, one county public defender office had six attorneys handling more than 
10,000 misdemeanor cases in one year.
13
  Given prevailing standards about how many cases an 
attorney can handle effectively, that office would have to hire 19 additional attorneys just to get 
the caseloads down to a manageable level.  And that is just one office in one state.  In a time of 
economic recession, it is hard to believe that the federal government would be willing to invest 
the amount of money that would be required to effectuate long-term nationwide change in the 
quality of indigent defense representation. 
 
Moreover, additional funding and better training would not solve many of the problems 
that states have had in living up to the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Supreme 
Court first held that indigent criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to the assistance of 
counsel at the state’s expense.14  Consider the problem of insufficient independence and 
oversight.  In some jurisdictions where judges assign lawyers to the indigent, there have been 
complaints about judges refusing to appoint lawyers who take their clients’ cases to trial more 
often than the judges would like.
15
  Of course, federal funding could be conditioned on a state’s 
agreement to meet minimal standards of quality and independence, but we cannot rely on the 
states’ elected branches to police their own compliance with those standards.  The public is not 
exactly clamoring for greater safeguards for criminal defendants, and state legislators who 
advocate for defense-friendly reforms are often accused of being soft on crime and voted out of 
office. 
 
Nor are the state judiciaries well-equipped to police the quality of indigent defense 
representation.  As an initial matter, many state judges are elected
16
 and, as a result, they are 
subject to the same political pressures to be tough on crime as their legislative and executive 
counterparts.  Moreover, in the vast majority of states, the very structure of the state criminal 
justice system prevents most litigants from having a realistic opportunity to challenge the 
effectiveness of their trial attorneys.
17
  In most jurisdictions, defendants are not permitted to 
challenge their trial attorneys’ effectiveness on direct appeal.  Rather, they must wait until the 
state collateral review process to present such a challenge.
18
  But collateral review often comes 
years after the original conviction, when the defendant is no longer constitutionally entitled to 
the assistance of counsel.
19
  As a result, forcing defendants to wait until collateral review 
                                                 
 
12
 See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing the Indigent Defense System, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y ISSUE BRIEF, 
Sept. 2010, available at http://acslaw.org/node/16836.  
13
 See Holder Remarks, supra note 5 (discussing this jurisdiction). 
14
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the state must provide indigent felony defendants with 
counsel); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (extending the rule in Gideon to misdemeanor cases 
involving a punishment of actual imprisonment). 
15
 See Holder Remarks, supra note 5. 
16
 See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact_sheet.pdf; see also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elected 
Judges and the Rule of Law, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995). 
17
 See generally Primus, supra note 2. 
18
 See Primus, supra note 2, at 691. 
19
 See id. at 680-81. 
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effectively means that most defendants never have a realistic opportunity to challenge their trial 
attorneys’ performance in state court.   
 
Some defendants have attempted to avoid this problem by joining together to file civil 
rights class actions in state courts in an effort to remedy systemic right-to-counsel problems.
20
  
Although some state courts have been receptive to these claims, they have to-date generated little 
actual change in the delivery of indigent defense services nationwide.
21
 
 
In short, the states have had more than 45 years to live up to Gideon’s promise, and they 
have failed.  It is time for the federal government to step in to protect this most fundamental 
right.  Criminal defendants need to have realistic access to a federal judicial forum to enforce 
their Sixth Amendment right to effective trial counsel.  Unfortunately, private litigants who try to 
vindicate their right to effective counsel in federal court now are routinely thwarted by 
procedural barriers.  Perhaps most notably, federal courts have relied on abstention doctrine to 
refuse to hear federal civil rights cases that allege systemic right-to-counsel violations.
22
   
 
Under Younger v. Harris,
23
 federal courts must abstain from enjoining or providing 
declaratory relief in pending state court criminal proceedings.  To interfere with ongoing state 
criminal proceedings, it is thought, would only promote needless conflict with a state’s 
administration of its criminal justice system in violation of federalism principles.  Moreover, 
such interference would increase federal court congestion, require the federal courts to answer 
difficult federal constitutional questions that might otherwise be disposed of on state law 
grounds, and entangle the federal courts in intricate questions of unsettled state law.  As a result, 
                                                 
 
20
 See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 
(2009) (discussing these lawsuits). 
21
 I do not mean to suggest that these lawsuits cannot be effective.  In some cases, they have resulted in consent 
decrees that effectuate some change or in legislative reforms.  See Cara H. Drinan, A Legislative Approach to 
Indigent Defense Reform, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y ISSUE BRIEF, July 2010, at 3-4 (discussing these cases), 
available at http://acslaw.org/node/16509.  However, the New York Court of Appeals’s recent decision in Hurrell-
Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2010), is a good example of the current ways in which state 
courts limit defendants’ ability to obtain systemic indigent defense reform.  Although that court did recognize the 
cognizability of a systemic right-to-counsel claim that alleged actual or constructive denial of counsel altogether, it 
also implicitly suggested that claims alleging systemic problems of ineffectiveness in attorney performance would 
not be cognizable.  See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 225-26, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05 (“Given the simplicity and 
autonomy of a claim for nonrepresentation, as opposed to one truly involving the adequacy of an attorney's 
performance, there is no reason . . . why such a claim cannot or should not be brought without the context of a 
completed prosecution.”).  Consider also the Michigan Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Duncan v. State, 784 
N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010), a case involving a constitutional challenge to the “systematic deficiencies” of Michigan’s 
indigent defense system.  The trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals had ruled that the alleged deficiencies 
in Michigan’s indigent defense system would, if proven, violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  Initially, the 
Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the case should be allowed to proceed.  However, upon the state’s request for 
reconsideration, the Court reversed its previous denial of summary disposition and dismissed the case on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims were not justiciable. 
22
 See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676-79 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court’s decision to 
dismiss a class action brought to challenge the adequacy of Georgia’s indigent criminal defense delivery system 
citing abstention doctrine). 
23
 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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federal courts routinely refuse to address the merits of Section 1983 class actions that allege 
ongoing systemic right-to-counsel violations.
24
 
 
Of course, some litigants may wait until after their criminal cases are over in the state 
courts to file federal Section 1983 class actions.  However, abstention doctrine further provides 
that federal courts may not interfere with state court criminal judgments after the fact, except in 
habeas corpus proceedings.
25
  Federal courts, with the exception of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
direct review, are not appellate courts charged with overseeing state court decisions.  Rather, 
they have jurisdiction to review state court judgments when Congress has created such 
jurisdiction, and Congress has established federal habeas corpus review as the primary 
mechanism for reviewing state court criminal judgments.  
 
As currently structured, however, federal habeas corpus review does little to remedy 
systemic right-to-counsel problems in the states.
26
  Federal judges expend enormous amounts of 
time reviewing habeas petitions from state prisoners, but most of that time is spent dismissing 
petitions on procedural grounds.  Even when a federal court addresses the merits, deferential 
standards of review all but ensure that the state conviction will stand.  In the extremely rare case 
where a federal court grants relief, the judgment comes years after the petitioner was wrongly 
imprisoned.  Given the rarity of such judgments and the long time lag between rights violations 
and any possible federal relief, federal habeas review has no real deterrent effect on state actors 
who create systemic problems in the first instance.    
 
For any proposed legislation to be effective, therefore, it must address these obstacles to 
federal court review.  In the sections that follow, I outline two new statutes that would do just 
that.  One would establish a federal enforcement action in which DOJ or a private litigant acting 
on its behalf can seek equitable relief in federal court.  The other would create a new federal 
habeas corpus cause of action designed to redress systemic right-to-counsel problems.  Proposed 
language for both of these statutes can be found in the appendix to this Issue Brief. 
 
II. A Federal Enforcement Action with a Deputization Provision 
 
DOJ should support, and Congress should enact, federal legislation that would prohibit 
any state from engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives criminal defendants of 
their right to effective counsel as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  To be 
effective, such legislation should establish two different mechanisms for obtaining equitable 
relief in federal court.  First, DOJ should be able to file federal enforcement actions to obtain 
equitable relief from systemic right-to-counsel violations throughout the country.  Second, DOJ 
should also be authorized to deputize private citizens and interest groups to file enforcement 
actions on its behalf. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
24
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
25
 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).   
26
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Primus, supra note 9. 
6 
A. Federal Enforcement Action 
 
First, the statute should create the possibility of federal enforcement actions initiated by 
DOJ against state actors who systematically violate defendants’ constitutional right to effective 
counsel.  In these federal enforcement actions, DOJ would be authorized to seek appropriate 
equitable relief, including injunctive relief, to stop states from engaging in practices that result in 
these systemic violations.   
 
Congress has created similar federal enforcement actions to stop state officials from 
engaging in systemic violations of other civil rights.  For example, after the Rodney King 
beatings, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which authorized DOJ to file civil actions in 
federal court against state law enforcement officials who violate citizens’ constitutional rights.  
Congress has also created a federal enforcement action to stop state actors from violating 
institutionalized persons’ civil rights.27   
 
In fact, DOJ already has the authority to file federal enforcement actions against state 
officials who engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives individuals involved in the 
juvenile justice system of their constitutional rights.
28
  The Department can and should use its 
enforcement power to stop states from systematically violating juveniles’ due process right to 
effective trial counsel.  And Congress should extend the Department’s authority to file federal 
enforcement actions to include systemic violations of adult criminal defendants’ rights as well as 
those of juveniles. 
 
A federal enforcement action is attractive for a couple of reasons.  First, a statute that 
provides for a federal enforcement action does not raise the same abstention concerns as does a 
statute that authorizes citizen suits.  A citizen suit provision would allow every criminal 
defendant who wanted to allege before trial that his appointed public defender was ineffective to 
file a federal action.  The federal courts would be inundated with cases, and there would be no 
check on frivolous claims.  Moreover, such a system would contravene the federalism principles 
that animate abstention doctrine.  Admittedly, most experts believe that Younger abstention is a 
prudential doctrine that could be displaced by statute.  However, some have argued that implicit 
limits on federal judicial power contained in the Supremacy Clause, Article III, and the Tenth 
Amendment constitutionally require Younger abstention.
29
  To the extent that there is any 
argument that Younger abstention is constitutionally required, the onslaught of federal filings and 
the potential disruption of an entire criminal justice system that would accompany a citizen suit 
provision would make the constitutional argument attractive to an overburdened federal judiciary 
that was concerned with maintaining the federalist balance.
30
  In contrast, giving DOJ the 
authority to file an action in a limited number of cases allows a small number of suits to go 
forward – enough suits to fix the problems, but without the same abstention concerns.   
                                                 
 
27
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a. 
28
 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
29
 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 812-43 (1991); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13.2 at 828-29 
(5th ed. 2007) (explaining that it is an open question whether Younger abstention is constitutional or prudential and 
summarizing the arguments on both sides). 
30
 See Primus, supra note 9, at 50-51. 
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Additionally, the involvement of the United States carries a certain gravitas that federal 
courts take quite seriously.  As a result, when DOJ has filed enforcement actions in other 
contexts, it has often brought the offending state officials to the negotiating table.
31
  Once 
engaged in negotiations, the offending state can think creatively about ways to solve its indigent 
defense problems without incurring prohibitive costs.  For example, a state that routinely denies 
counsel to traffic offenders who face imprisonment could choose to decriminalize its traffic 
offenses or remove the potential for incarceration as a penalty for the traffic offenses.  Either 
move would obviate the state’s obligation to provide counsel to the traffic offenders with little 
fiscal penalty to the state.  A federal enforcement action would allow DOJ to work with the states 
in devising creative solutions. 
 
B. Deputization Provision  
 
In addition to a federal enforcement action, the proposed statute has a deputization 
provision under which DOJ could authorize private litigants to file federal enforcement actions 
in the name of the United States.  The deputization concept, originally proposed by Professor 
Myriam Gilles in the Section 14141 context, allows DOJ to spread the costs of filing these 
enforcement actions by enlisting the help of nongovernmental actors who are expert in these 
areas (e.g., the ACLU).
32
  To give these nongovernmental actors an incentive to file these 
actions, a fee-shifting provision in the statute would allow them to recover attorneys’ fees if they 
win.  This feature is typical in civil rights statutes.
33
  Because these actors are “deputized” to act 
on the behalf of the United States, they enjoy the same privileges with respect to standing and 
abstention that the United States would.  That is, they stand in the shoes of the United States for 
purposes of these lawsuits.   
 
The precise format of deputization proposed here is new, but the general approach of 
federal deputization is well established across several litigation contexts.  Qui tam actions 
provide one salient example:  The False Claims Act authorizes the government to bring civil 
actions against those who defraud it,
34
 and the Act’s qui tam provision authorizes private citizens 
with independent knowledge of fraud perpetrated against the government to sue and recover a 
portion of the claim.  When individuals sue under that provision, they stand in the shoes of the 
United States.  Other examples of deputization include the independent counsel statute, the 
judicial practice of deputizing private security personnel to enforce federal labor injunctions, and 
DOJ’s tapping a private attorney (David Boies) to direct its antitrust suit against the Microsoft 
Corporation.  As these examples illustrate, the general authority to deputize is grounded in 
practice and history.   
 
Past experience with federal enforcement actions filed under Section 14141 demonstrate 
why a deputization provision is needed here.  As discussed earlier, DOJ currently has the 
authority under Section 14141 to file federal enforcement actions against states that are 
                                                 
 
31
 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement 
of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1404-06 (2000) (collecting cases). 
32
 See id.   
33
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
34
 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
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systematically depriving juveniles of their due process right to effective trial counsel.  However, 
the problem of states systematically violating juveniles’ constitutional right to counsel persists.  
Some states routinely deny juveniles access to counsel altogether.
35
  Others have imposed 
unrealistic caps on the fees that they will pay to attorneys who handle juvenile delinquency 
cases, regardless of the severity of the charges.
36
  DOJ should be filing more enforcement actions 
to stop these systemic violations.  However, DOJ has limited resources.  A private attorney 
general provision would allow DOJ to do more to achieve its goal of enforcing defendants’ 
constitutional right to effective trial counsel without requiring as much expenditure of federal 
resources. 
 
A federal enforcement action (even with a deputization provision) retains a fair amount 
of political accountability with respect to the decision to sue and seek relief.  DOJ has to approve 
each lawsuit that is filed on its behalf and would have the authority to quash a lawsuit filed in its 
name at any time.  As a result, the efficacy of a federal enforcement action is contingent on 
different administrations’ political priorities.  I therefore offer a second proposal designed to 
provide backstop protection against any administration that would curtail enforcement actions.  
That second proposal is a new post-trial federal habeas corpus action. 
 
III. A Post-Trial Systemic Habeas Corpus Cause of Action37 
 
In addition to a federal enforcement action with a deputization provision, Congress 
should add a new chapter to Title 28 that would create a specific habeas corpus cause of action 
for systemic right-to-counsel violations.  A post-trial habeas cause of action would avoid all of 
the abstention problems that until now have prevented litigants from successfully asserting 
systemic challenges in federal court.  Moreover, if designed properly, a systemic habeas cause of 
action is more insulated from constitutional attack than other forms of potential structural reform 
litigation and, as a result, has the best chance of promoting lasting indigent defense reform.  In 
the sections that follow, I will address both how to design a systemic habeas cause of action and 
why a habeas cause of action is preferable to a modified-1983 cause of action or other citizen 
suit provision. 
 
A. How to Structure a Systemic Habeas Cause of Action 
 
Under a systemic habeas model, habeas petitions would still be filed by individual 
petitioners.  The petitioner would initially have two burdens.  First, he would have to 
demonstrate that his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.  
Second, he would have the burden of producing some evidence that the error was not an isolated 
one, but rather part of a larger pattern or practice of state actors systematically violating 
defendants’ right to effective counsel.  The first requirement is merely a standing requirement.  
The petitioner would have to show that his federal rights were prejudicially violated both to 
ensure that he has a sufficient stake in the outcome to be a motivated litigant and to provide the 
                                                 
 
35
 See, e.g., NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, “A RACE TO THE BOTTOM,” EVALUATION OF THE TRIAL-LEVEL 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN MICHIGAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ii (2008). 
36
 See, e.g., Georgia N. Vagenas, Review of National Indigent Defense Developments, 11 DIALOGUE 19 (2007). 
37
 This section builds upon an idea for a post-trial systemic habeas corpus cause of action that I first proposed in A 
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010), and borrows heavily from that article. 
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federal courts with a representative example of the larger systemic problem.  The second 
requirement is meant to impose a modest burden of production on the petitioner.  In essence, the 
habeas court should ask whether, taking all of the petitioner’s statements as true and drawing all 
inferences in his favor, there was some evidence of a systemic state problem.  Because much of 
the data about the state’s practices in other cases is in the hands of the state rather than the 
petitioner, this burden is intentionally not a high one.  Petitioners could rely on trial transcripts or 
extra-record affidavits filed by public defenders, prosecutors, or others to document systemic 
right-to-counsel problems.  
 
Once the petitioner carries this initial burden, the burden of proof would shift to the state 
to prove that no such systemic state practice exists.  If the federal court finds no systemic right-
to-counsel violation, it should dismiss the petition.  But if the court finds a systemic problem, it 
should order the form of relief that is traditional in habeas corpus:  conditional release of the 
petitioner.  Specifically, the federal judge should remand the petitioner’s case to the state courts 
with an order documenting the systemic right-to-counsel problem and giving the state two 
options:  either (1) remedy the systemic error within a reasonable period of time and apply the 
remedy to the instant petitioner’s case, or (2) release the petitioner from custody.   
 
If the state chooses to remedy the systemic right-to-counsel error, the federal court would 
reset the case for a second hearing after a reasonable period of time has passed in order to give 
the state the opportunity to redress the problem.  At the later federal court hearing, the state 
would explain how it had fixed the problem and how it had applied its remedy to the petitioner’s 
case, and the federal court would either approve the proposed solution and dismiss the 
petitioner’s habeas action or tell the state that the proposed solution is constitutionally 
insufficient.  At that point, the court would either order the petitioner released or extend the time 
to give the state a second chance to come up with a remedy.  If an extension were granted, the 
process would repeat until (1) the state came up with a constitutionally satisfactory alternative, 
(2) the state chose to release the petitioner, or (3) the federal court ordered the state to release the 
petitioner. 
 
If the state fails to remedy the systemic right-to-counsel violation and the petitioner is 
released, all future petitions in which petitioners allege that they were victims of the same 
systemic right-to-counsel violation would be fast-tracked in the federal district court.  Upon a 
finding of prejudice in each particular case, the federal courts would issue the same order of 
conditional release.  Thus, state prisoners would be released on an expedited basis until the state 
chose to fix the problem.  The prospect of a wave of conditional release orders would 
substantially increase the state’s incentive to reform.  But the conditional release order allows the 
state to choose its own approach to solving the problem. 
 
In order to ensure that these systemic habeas actions are effectively presented to the 
federal courts, the statute should have a fee-shifting provision to ensure that private interest 
groups will represent petitioners with potentially meritorious claims.  If there is adequate 
representation of the petitioners’ interests by effective counsel and a systemic challenge is 
rejected or if the state remedies the systemic problem, the ban on successive petitions should 
prohibit other petitioners from raising the same challenge in later proceedings (unless there is a 
change in state practices in the interim). 
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Importantly, the proposed statute should eliminate the exhaustion barrier to review that 
currently plagues federal habeas adjudication.  Under current exhaustion doctrine, a habeas 
petitioner must first present her federal claims to the highest state court in accordance with state 
procedural rules before the federal courts will entertain the claim.
38
  The exhaustion doctrine, 
like its abstention counterpart in the Section 1983 context, is premised on principles of 
federalism as well as concerns about conserving federal judicial resources.  However, habeas 
petitioners are not required to exhaust state remedies if there is no available state corrective 
process or if the state process is ineffective at protecting their rights.
39
  Systemic state violations 
of the right to counsel are, by definition, circumstances under which the state process is 
ineffective.  It would accordingly be futile for litigants to present their claims of systemic right-
to-counsel violations to the states, and litigants should not be required to exhaust state remedies 
before presenting these systemic challenges on federal habeas. 
 
Eliminating the delays arising from the exhaustion requirement would yield many 
benefits.  Perhaps most importantly for the project of correcting systemic misbehavior, 
permitting petitioners to commence their habeas actions with less delay would improve the 
feedback mechanism to the offending states, thus increasing the deterrent value of the federal 
decisions.  It often takes years to exhaust a federal claim in the state courts.
40
  If a federal court 
grants habeas relief only years after a state errs, the case may have been forgotten, and the 
personnel may have changed, such that the federal decision has effectively no deterrent or 
reforming value.  Moreover, reducing delay would make it easier for federal judges to grant 
relief in deserving cases without fear that states would be unable to retry the petitioners.  Finally, 
shortening the timeline would bring habeas within the reach of large numbers of convicted 
defendants whom the custody requirement now prevents from seeking habeas relief at all.
41
  A 
habeas corpus petition is, by definition, only available to persons who are currently being held in 
violation of federal law.  Most people who are convicted of state crimes complete their 
sentences, and are thus no longer in state custody, before they finish exhausting all possible 
avenues of relief in the state courts.  The exhaustion requirement therefore ensures that very few 
defendants ever have the opportunity to file habeas petitions.  Eliminating the exhaustion 
requirement would enable many more defendants to seek habeas relief.  In short, without an 
exhaustion requirement, federal habeas relief could come more swiftly in those cases where it is 
warranted.  That increased speed would improve the feedback mechanism to the states, thus 
increasing the corrective value of the federal decisions.   
 
B. Comparisons to Citizen-Suit Provisions and Modified Section 1983 Causes of 
Action 
 
If Congress is inclined to enact legislation that creates a new cause of action designed to 
redress systemic right-to-counsel violations, it is logical to question why that statute should be a 
systemic habeas corpus statute rather than a modified Section 1983 cause of action or some other 
                                                 
 
38
 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
39
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 
40
 See Primus, supra note 2, at 680.  
41
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (requiring custody). 
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form of citizen suit.  The structural habeas solution proposed here might be a better alternative 
for both constitutional and prudential reasons. 
 
1. Constitutional Reasons 
 
A post-trial systemic habeas cause of action is less susceptible to constitutional challenge 
than a pre-trial citizen suit or a modified Section 1983 statute.  Because a habeas cause of action 
is a post-trial cause of action, it does not raise any of the abstention concerns that are raised by 
citizen suits and Section 1983 litigation.  To the extent that there is an argument that abstention is 
a constitutional principle, therefore, a systemic habeas cause of action is not subject to challenge 
in the way that a citizen suit or Section 1983 action would be.  Moreover, there is some debate 
right now about the precise contours of the Strickland v. Washington right to effective trial 
counsel and how the standard is to be applied to pre-trial actions by counsel.  Any statute that 
defined the contours of that right in a way that goes beyond what the Supreme Court has said 
may exceed Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.42  Congress 
may enact legislation that remedies a constitutional violation, but it may not substantively change 
the governing law by expanding the definition of what is a constitutional violation.
43
  A post-trial 
habeas cause of action does not pose a similar risk of being struck down on these grounds.   
 
2. Prudential Reasons 
 
Many helpful elements of the desired systemic scheme map onto core aspects of 
traditional habeas.  First, there is an important difference in pleading requirements between 
Section 1983 and habeas review.  Because there is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 lawsuits, 
states have been held to be inappropriate defendants.  As a result, plaintiffs filing Section 1983 
lawsuits must sue individual officers for relief.  Such rules are problematic in the context of 
redressing systemic state right-to-counsel violations given that such problems typically exist 
because of the action or inaction of multiple state actors.  The responsibility for a systemic 
problem is often much more diffuse, which compromises the defendant’s ability to name each 
officer responsible for the alleged systemic problem.  Moreover, to the extent that the defendant 
is able to name each person, the number of defendants involved is likely to be high in many 
cases, which results in more complex litigation and requires more federal judicial time, energy, 
and resources.  
  
In contrast, a habeas corpus petition is directed to the custodian holding the petitioner, 
because the requested remedy is release from the custodian’s facility.  It is generally understood 
that filing a civil habeas corpus petition against the custodian of a facility is tantamount to filing 
against the state.  The custodian is represented by the state attorney general’s office, and the state 
is the party with the vested interest in protecting its conviction and preventing release.  Pleading 
against a custodian who putatively represents the state is much simpler.   
 
There is also the matter of remedy.  The traditional habeas remedy – conditional or 
outright release of a single petitioner – is less likely than the injunctive relief associated with 
                                                 
 
42
 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
43
 See id. at 518-19. 
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Section 1983 or a similar citizen-suit provision to create the kinds of problems that characterized 
early efforts at judicially-imposed structural reform.  First, the fact that the relief provided by the 
federal court is individualized (that is, that conditional orders of release come one by one) makes 
it more politically palatable for a judge to grant relief.  There is no requirement of immediate 
relief for all affected prisoners, and the state is not ordered to take expensive and time-
consuming action.  Rather, a systemic habeas approach gives the state the option of releasing 
prisoners and taking its time to think about how, and even whether, to devise a more 
comprehensive remedy.  In the Section 1983 context, although the offending state institution 
plays an active role in crafting remedial orders, an unelected federal judge is still forcing the 
state to enact reforms.  In contrast, a judge who orders a habeas petitioner released does not 
bypass democratic institutions in the states and does not force the state to enact reforms.  The 
state does not have to enact any reforms.  Instead, the threat of more conditional release orders 
gives the state an incentive to fix its procedures in its own way.  It also gives the state the time 
and flexibility to distribute the costs of reform as it sees fit.  If a state wants to decriminalize 
certain behavior or legislatively remove imprisonment as a possible penalty so as to decrease its 
constitutional obligations to provide counsel, it can decrease its costs by doing so.  The offending 
state can choose a judicial, legislative, or executive solution to the problem or can just opt to 
leave the problem intact and release prisoners whose rights were prejudicially affected.  This 
system is much more deferential to the state than a judicial order instructing the state to change 
and specifying how the reform must proceed.   
 
Of course, Congress could create a modified Section 1983 action with the conditional 
release remedy proposed here, but release from confinement is the quintessential remedy for 
habeas actions.  The difference in remedies is one of the key distinctions between habeas and 
Section 1983, and this proposal's use of the traditional habeas remedy is one of its central 
features.  It therefore makes sense to locate this proposal in the framework of habeas rather than 
that of Section 1983. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
As Attorney General Eric Holder recently stated, “[p]utting politics aside, we must 
address the fact that there is a crisis within our nation’s system of indigent defense.”44  
Admittedly, legislative reforms that aid indigent defendants are typically difficult to enact given 
the pressure to be tough on crime.  But the indigent defense crisis has reached such epidemic 
proportions that the federal executive and legislative branches are now willing to intervene.  We 
should take advantage of this rare moment to ensure the passage of meaningful reforms.   
 
Part of ensuring meaningful long-term reform requires giving indigent defendants access 
to a federal forum to challenge systemic state practices that routinely violate their right to 
effective trial counsel.  The combined effect of the federal enforcement action with a 
deputization provision and the post-trial systemic habeas corpus cause of action that I propose in 
this Issue Brief will do just that.   
                                                 
 
44
 See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 2009 American Bar Association Convention, Chicago, IL (Aug. 
3, 2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/Attorney_General_Eric_Holder_2009_ABA_HOD.
pdf. 
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The proposed habeas statute, if enacted, could redress systemic right-to-counsel problems 
regardless of whether any pre-trial civil action is enacted.  To the extent that there is support for 
pre-trial intervention, the proposed federal enforcement action with a deputization provision is 
the most viable option politically as well as the least expensive option.  If DOJ uses its power 
under the federal enforcement action statute effectively, there will be fewer successful post-trial 
systemic habeas challenges.  But it is important to have the post-trial actions available in case 
DOJ chooses not to file enforcement actions or deputize others to do so.  
14 
Appendix 
 
Proposal 1:  A Federal Enforcement Action with a Deputization Provision 
 
TITLE 42.  THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
CHAPTER 136.  VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
            SUBCHAPTER IX – STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
                  Section F – Redressing Systemic State Violations of the Right to Counsel 
 
§ 14165.  Cause of Action. 
 
(a) Unlawful Conduct.  It shall be unlawful for any state judge, state legislator, state 
executive official, and/or any other state or local employee with responsibility for 
establishing, administering, monitoring, or evaluating the provision of indigent 
defense services in a state to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that 
deprives criminal defendants of their right to effective counsel as protected by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
 
(b) Civil Action by Attorney General.  Whenever the Attorney General has 
reasonable cause to believe that a violation of subsection (a) of this section has 
occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a 
civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the 
pattern or practice.  Such relief may include injunctive relief when appropriate. 
 
(c) Deputization Provision.  The Attorney General may authorize or deputize private 
litigants to file civil actions under subsection (b) in the name of the United States. 
 
(1) Procedure.  A private person who has been the victim of a state pattern or 
practice of conduct that has deprived or threatens to deprive that person of 
the right to effective counsel and who wishes to file a civil action under 
this section shall file a petition with the United States explaining the 
nature of the alleged unconstitutional pattern or practice.  The United 
States shall investigate the allegations and shall decide whether to (i) file a 
civil action under subsection (b); (ii) deputize the petitioner to file a civil 
action under subsection (c); or (iii) quash the petition and prohibit the 
private litigant from filing a civil action under this section.  The United 
States shall notify the petitioner of its decision within 180 days from the 
date on which it receives the petition.  
 
(2) United States Involvement.  The United States may intervene in any civil 
action that it authorizes a petitioner to file under subsection (c).  The 
United States may, at any time, remove its authorization and quash a civil 
action filed under subsection (c).   
 
(d) Attorney’s Fees.  In any action or proceeding brought under subsection (c), the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee 
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as part of the costs.  In awarding an attorney’s fee under this section, the court, in 
its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee. 
 
(e) Nonrestriction of Other Rights.  Nothing in this section shall restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any other statute or under 
the common law to seek redress for an unconstitutional violation of the right to 
effective counsel. 
 
(f) Abstention Exception.  A federal court entertaining a petition for relief filed under 
this section shall not be subject to the restrictions in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37 (1971). 
 
(g)       Severability of Provisions.  If any provision of this section is held to be invalid, 
the remainder of this section shall not be affected. 
 
Proposal 2:  A Post-Trial Systemic Habeas Cause of Action that can be Filed by Individual 
Petitioners 
 
TITLE 28.  Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 
Part VI.  Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 154A.       Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in State Cases Involving Systemic 
State Violations of the Constitutional Right to Counsel 
 
§ 2267.  Prisoners in State Custody Due to Systemic State Violations of the Constitutional Right 
to Counsel; Applicability of Chapter; Definitions. 
 
(a) This chapter shall apply to cases brought by prisoners in state custody who allege 
that they have been victims of a systemic state practice that violates their right to 
effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
(b)       Definitions.  In this chapter, the term “systemic state practice” refers to any 
routine pattern or practice of conduct by state judges, state legislators, state 
executive officials, and/or any other state or local employees with responsibility 
for establishing, administering, monitoring, or evaluating the provision of indigent 
defense services in the state.  The term “systemic state violation” refers to a 
systemic state practice that results in the routine violation of defendants’ right to 
effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
§ 2268.  Remedies in Federal Court. 
 
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state 
custody who alleges that he is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court 
issued after proceedings in which he was the victim of a systemic state practice 
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that violated his right to effective counsel under the Sixth and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. 
 
(b) Counsel. 
 
(1) In all proceedings brought under this chapter, and any subsequent 
proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel, except as provided 
by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority.  Counsel should be appointed to pro se applicants, when 
practicable, unless the application and supporting materials conclusively 
show that the applicant is entitled to no relief.  Counsel must be appointed 
for an applicant who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A.  
 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 
applicant should he prevail in a special habeas corpus action filed under 
this chapter.  In awarding an attorney’s fee under this section, the court, in 
its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee. 
 
(c) Burdens.   
 
(1) The applicant shall have the burden of establishing that his right to 
effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment either is currently being 
violated or was violated in the state court proceedings pursuant to which 
he is in custody.  
 
(2) The applicant shall also have the burden of producing some evidence that 
the violation of his right to effective counsel was part of a systemic state 
practice that violates defendants’ right to effective counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution as incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The applicant may rely on affidavits or other documents 
attached to his application to satisfy this burden of production. 
 
(3) Once the applicant has satisfied his burden of production under clause (2), 
the burden of persuasion shall be on the state to prove that there is no 
systemic state violation.  
 
(d) Evidentiary Hearings and Discovery. 
 
(1) Once an application is filed, unless the application and supporting 
materials conclusively show that the applicant is entitled to no relief, the 
court shall grant a prompt hearing thereon. 
 
(2) The court may, sua sponte or on request of a party, authorize discovery 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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(e) Remedies. 
 
(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus filed under this chapter shall be 
granted if the applicant’s right to effective counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution as incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated and the violation is part of a systemic state 
violation. 
 
(2) The only remedy that the court may grant is conditional release of the 
applicant.  When issuing an order of conditional release under this chapter, 
the court shall notify the state of the nature of the systemic state violation 
and explain how the systemic state violation resulted in a violation of the 
applicant’s rights.  The state shall be given a reasonable period of time in 
which to eliminate the systemic state practice, find a constitutionally 
acceptable alternative practice, and apply its alternative practice to the 
applicant.  If within the reasonable time given the state fails to eliminate 
the systemic state practice, find a constitutionally acceptable alternative 
practice, and apply its new practice to the applicant, the court shall order 
the immediate release of the applicant.   
 
(3) Once an applicant is ordered released pursuant to the procedures described 
in subsection (e)(1)-(2), all future applications alleging the same systemic 
state violation shall be directed to the court that issued the order finding a 
systemic state violation.  Such applications shall be given priority by that 
court over all noncapital matters.  Each applicant whose state court 
judgment was prejudiced by the systemic state violation shall obtain the 
same relief described in subsection (e)(1)-(2).   
 
(f) Stay and Abeyance.  A court may stay consideration of an application filed under 
this chapter pending resolution of a hearing in another case involving the same 
alleged systemic state violation.   
 
(g) Transfer of Cases.  If a federal court finds a systemic state violation, all pending 
and future applications that allege the same systemic state violation shall be 
transferred to the court that found the systemic state violation for resolution 
pursuant to subsection (e)(3). 
 
(h) Exhaustion Not Required.  An applicant shall not be required to present his claims 
to the courts of the state before filing an application in federal court under this 
chapter. 
 
(i) Relationship to Section 2254.  An applicant may file a petition under this chapter 
and also file a petition under Section 2254.  In a habeas corpus proceeding filed 
under Section 2254, a prior judgment under this chapter shall be conclusive as to 
all issues of fact or law that were actually adjudicated and decided by the court in 
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the proceedings under this chapter, unless the applicant shall plead and the court 
shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not appear in 
the record of the proceedings under this chapter and the court shall further find 
that the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254 could not have 
caused such fact to appear in such record by the exercise of reasonable diligence.  
This provision shall not be interpreted to bar an individual ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim filed in a proceeding under Section 2254 on different grounds of 
ineffectiveness from those raised in the proceedings under this chapter.   
 
        In an action filed under this chapter, a prior determination in a habeas corpus proceeding 
filed under Section 2254 shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law that were actually 
adjudicated and decided by the court in the Section 2254 proceedings, unless the applicant shall 
plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling fact which did not 
appear in the record of the proceedings under Section 2254 and the court shall further find that 
the applicant under this chapter could not have caused such fact to appear in such record by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.  This provision shall not be interpreted to bar an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim filed under this chapter on different grounds of ineffectiveness than 
were raised in the proceedings under Section 2254. 
